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MAPPING LEGAL THEORY 
RICHARD F. DEVLIN' 
In this essay, the author briefly outlines recent 
trends in Canadian jurisprudence. Beginning with a 
brief overview of the classical jurisprudential debate 
between natural lawyers, legal positivists, and legal 
realists, the author then provides an introduction to 
a new theoretical tradition which he terms 
"A rtif actualism ", as well as a survey of contemporary 
''Artifactualist Jurisprudence". He argues that there 
has been a significant theoretical shift away from the 
classical conceptualization of law as morality ( as 
embodied in natural law, and challenged by legal 
posltlvism and legal realism), toward the 
conceptualization of law as politics ( as promulgated 
by artifactualism). This new conceptualization of law 
as the "terrain of struggle over the meaning and 
quality of social existence" has informed the works of 
Artifactualist jurisprudents in the areas of Liberalism, 
Marxism, Feminism, First Nations and Critical Legal 
Studies, and serves to elucidate some of the tensions 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Dans le present essai, !'auteur decrit rapidement 
Les tendances recentes de la science juridique 
canadienne. II commence par un bref survol du debat 
jurisprudentiel ciassique opposant /es avocats 
naturels, ceux qui se classent parmi !es positivistes et 
/es realistes. L 'auteur presente ensuite une nouvelle 
tradition theorique qu 'ii qualifi.e d' «artefactualisme», 
et passe en revue la science du droit artefactuelle 
contemporaine. II soutient que la theorie s'ecarte 
notablement de la conceptualisation classique du 
droit en tant que moralite (incarne par le droit 
nature[ et remis en question par le positivisme et le 
realisme juridique), pour evoluer vers la 
conceptualisation du droit en tant que politique (ce 
que promulgue l'artefactualisme). Cette nouvelle 
conceptualisation, qui fail du droit «un champ de 
bataille sur le sens et la qualite de /'existence 
sociale», inspire /es travaux des 1unstes 
artefactualistes qui se penchent sur le liberalisme, le 
marxisme, le feminisme, /es premieres nations, ainsi 
que !es etudes de droit critique. Elle sert a elucider 
certaines des tensions presentes dans la Charle 
canadienne des droits et libertes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For some, an essay on legal theory may appear to be an interloper in a book that has 
the pragmatic question of legal developments in particular doctrinal areas over the last 
twenty-five years as its primary focus. However, two aspects of my own experience 
suggest to me that it is important to raise jurisprudential questions in a forum that has 
legal practitioners as its principal target market. The first is that, as a teacher for some six 
years, I continually find myself perturbed by the phenomenon that many first year students 
appear to have a wealth of experience to draw upon when they arrive at law school, but 
lose so much of that as they proceed through what the professoriate, perhaps rather 
grandiosely, calls "the academic program". Legal education as a discipline, I would argue, 
is viciously disciplinary in that it aspires to exclude and render irrelevant other viewpoints. 
The focus on formalistic rules an ·d instrumentalist skills means that the talent of critical 
thinking is, by and large, underdeveloped in the law schools.1 
My second point also relates to this tendency towards the closing of the legal mind. 
When I have discussions with some of my former students or current practitioner-friends 
about the nature of the problems they encounter in practice, or even about some of the 
larger legal issues that preoccupy the public agenda, I am always disturbed by the narrow 
conceptualization of the issues. To be clear, my suggestion is not that such people are not 
very bright. Rather, it is that their imaginative horizons appear to be so curtailed by their 
conceptual framework that alternative conceptualizations appear to be simply 
unintelligible, essentially "non-questions".2 "Black letterism" as an ideology curtails their 
frameworks of analysis.3 
Perhaps an example may help. On several occasions over the last few years I have 
found myself in situations where members of the judiciary and I were embarked upon an 
intensive inquiry into a series of issues that necessarily required reflection on the nature 
and function of law in contemporary Canadian society. One of the most frustrating aspects 
of this experience was endeavouring to have these judges even go through the process of 
attempting to consider the importance of reflection on the primary jurisprudential question, 
namely, the nature and function of Canada's current legal system. For them it seemed too 
elemental, too taken for granted to merit analysis. 
In this essay, I wish to attempt to bridge this void between those who practice legal 
theory in the academy, and those who practice legal practice, be they lawyers or judges. 
My analysis is composed of two parts. First, I shall trace a very brief history of 
jurisprudential time, highlighting the legal theoretical traditions of Natural Law, Legal 
Positivism and Legal Realism. Second, I will demonstrate how these traditions have been 
For an elaboration of these ideas, see R.F. Devlin, "The Commitment: Deviating with Private Law" 
[ unpublished]. 
J. McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs CJf an Ontological Exile" in A. Miles & G. Finn, eds., Feminism in 
Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989) 37. 
For one example of such a myopic viewpoint see D. Watson, "Is Legal Scholarship Failing?" (1991) 
15:1 Can. Law. 20. 
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eclipsed by the emergence of a new legal paradigm that I will call "Artifactualism".4 On 
this foundation, I will emphasize aspects of the perspectives of some of the major players 
in the debates within this new interpretive framework of "Artifactual Jurisprudence" 
including: Liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, First Nations perspectives and Critical Legal 
Studies. My own perspective is an amalgam of several of these, but is most closely 
indentified with the last grouping. 
My aim is extremely modest. It is simply to provide a map so that lawyers can better 
understand the terrain of social, political and philosophical debate in which law and legal 
practice inevitably find themselves - woods and trees and all that sort of stuff. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JURISPRUDENTIAL TIME 
In this section, I propose to develop a concise historical overview of the dominant 
traditions of legal theory in order to set the context for a better understanding of 
contemporary analyses. Within the framework of analysis that I wish to provide, the four 
major jurisprudential strands of legal philosophy are: Natural Law, Legal Positivism, 
Legal Realism, and Artifactualism. My purpose is merely to highlight the key components 
of each perspective and therefore, unfortunately, to underplay the vitally important debates 
that go on within each. The general proposition is that as jurisprudence has shifted from 
Naturalism, through Positivism and Realism to Artifactualism, there has been a 
"denaturalization" process whereby law is no longer seen as transcendental, somehow "out 
there" and autonomous of human activity. Rather, there is an increasing recognition that 
law is no more than a human construct, an artifact of human agency, contingent, socially 
and historically located, and (perhaps most importantly) therefore capable of renovation. 
Consequently, those affected by and involved with law can no longer claim that law is 
part of the natural order, beyond their control. Rather, this denaturalization process 
highlights the centrality of human action and the responsibilities that go along with such 
power.5 
A. THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 
The Natural Law tradition stretches back at least two thousand years to Greek 
philosophers and has been continually revised up to the present day. Whether it is Natural 
Law in its pagan rationalistic forms (Greek and Roman), or Christian divinic forms (St. 
Augustine and Aquinas), or its secularized, social contractarian and rights-based forms 
(Hobbes and Locke), several key themes unite these otherwise very diverse jurists. First, 
Natural Law claims to be universal, immutable, eternal, objective, and beyond any 
( 
particularized political or historical context. Natural Law thinking is the quest for absolute 
values, justice and truth. Second, Natural Lawyers propose that the validity of any law 
depends on its content, not just its form. There is an integral relationship between law and 
These ideas of "Artifactualism" and "Artifactual Jurisprudence" are inspired, in part, by the social 
theory of R.M. Unger, Politics (England: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
This "denaturalization thesis" is derived in part from the ideas of "postmodemism". For a further 
articulation of both of these concepts see R.F. Devlin, "Reconstituting the Irish Hunger Strike as a 
Legal Claim: Postmodemism Meets Irish Republicanism" (forthcoming). 
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morality. Third, Natural Law is said to be superior to human law and therefore has the 
justificatory and censorial power to determine whether enacted (i.e. positive) laws are 
morally binding. 
Beyond these three themes, Natural Lawyers claim that their theory provides the best 
explanation for an obligation to obey the law. It provides both moral and legal arguments 
for obedience because a law is valid only if it is in accordance with "right reason". Such 
law has an intrinsic value independent of the ends it achieves and it need not be justified 
. according to its utility. Natural Law is portrayed as the symbolic representation of justice 
and thereby encourages us to pursue "the good". Natural Lawyers argue that law and 
justice can never be separated, because to do so will result in a legal formalism that can 
be conducive to, for example, Nazi laws. 
A variety of criticisms have undercut the validity and vitality of Natural Law theory. 
First, it is argued that this theory is not as universal as it claims to be. Attention has been 
focused on its mostly Roman Catholic presuppositions, and Natural Law theory has been 
accused of being an assertion of faith in a particular set of values rather than a 
demonstration of the truth of such values. Second, it is said that Natural Law is inherently 
ambiguous and no variation has ever provided a clear set of principles which could 
effectively guide or constrain positive (i.e. human made) law. Because of its refusal to 
take account of the reality of historical, empirical, scientific, anthropological and other 
factors, it is said by critics to be much too general, abstract and vague to offer any really 
practicable legal solutions in the face of any detailed and definite set of facts. A closely 
related third criticism is the malleability of Natural Law. At different times in different 
places, it has played conservative, liberal and even revolutionary roles. Natural Law is all 
things to all people - depending upon their own ideological bent. Fourth, sceptics posit 
that there is no rational way to know objectively what is right and what is wrong, and, 
as such, Natural Law propositions are necessarily relative, personal and subjective. No 
amount of information about human nature provides proof that anything ought or ought 
not to be done as a consequence. As Hume pointed out, you cannot derive "an ought" 
proposition from an "is" proposition.6 Finally, the critics argue that merging law with 
moral criteria causes confusion in our attempts to understand what law is. 
B. LEGAL POSITIVISM 
Positivism is both more recent than, and a reaction against, Natural Law theory. Hints 
of Positivism can be identified in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume, but it was not 
until the writings of Bentham and Austin in the nineteenth century, and those of H.L.A. 
Hart and Kelsen in the twentieth century, that it came into its own as a jurisprudential 
movement. Positivism wants to provide an analytical approach that allows us to know 
what law "is". Consequently, it seeks to keep the question of "what law is" distinct from 
the question of "what law ought to be," proposing that no reference to extrinsic factors 
such as justice or morality should enter into the definition of law. Positivism is driven by 
a quest for conceptual clarity and order. It aspires to be a scientific account of law. While 
D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Book III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 1. 
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few Positivists deny the importance of morality as an external criterion by which to assess 
any particular law, they nevertheless seek a temporary exclusion of morality so that law 
sui generis may be better understood. 
After rejecting Natural Law's reliance on moralism, Positivists embraced empiricism: 
the belief that the essence of law could be discovered by empirical methodologies. This 
was an important breakthrough because it recognized that law is the product of human 
action and not merely the embodiment of some greater authority. Positivism saw law as 
essentially a system of rules and/or commands that generate habitual obedience. However, 
although Positivism reoriented legal philosophy and factored in human agency, its 
scientific pretensions meant that it did not take human agency seriously enough. 
Positivism stressed the structural processes that it believed underpinned people's relations 
but did not analyze the behaviour of the actual humans involved. This approach 
culminated in Hans Kelsen's self proclaimed Pure Theory of Law,7 which sought to purge 
analyses of law from what were seen as the contaminating influences of politics, ethics, 
sociology and history. 
Positivism has had, and continues to have, a profound influence on legal thought in 
Canada.8 It is the primary philosophy relied upon by those who argue that law is still 
relatively autonomous from other social forces such as politics, economics, gender and 
race. These factors are rarely, if ever, incorporated into Positivistic inquiries of law. So, 
while human agency is acknowledged, no real attention is focused on the consequences 
of such agency for law. This has generated some criticisms of Positivism. First, it is 
accused of creating an ideology in which the validity of a law becomes its own moral 
criterion (usually called formalism) and this can lead to very unjust legal systems. Second, 
it is argued that Positivism's attempt to isolate law from its social, economic and political 
context to treat law as an object of scientific study, is an inappropriate extension of the 
methodologies of natural science. It is difficult even to identify, let alone study, the 
institutions and the actors who make up the legal system without also considering their 
context. and function. 
C. LEGAL REALISM 
Realism is a thoroughly modernistic phenomenon, surfacing in different forms in both 
Scandinavia and the United States in the early part of this century. To consider the North 
American version, American Realism was the product of a relatively small group of 
progressive scholars and judges whose pragmatism drove them to reject both the moralism 
of the Naturalists and the "arid conceptualism" of the Positivists. Thus, for example, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that "the life of the law has not been logic, but 
experience. "9 Realism sought to factor in some of those very elements of human agency 
that Positivism strove to marginalize. 
(California: University of California Press, 1934). 
For an important discussion of the influences of both natural law and legal positivism in the early 
years of the Canadian legal community see G.B. Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal 
Thought in the Late Victorian Empire" (1985) 7 L. & Hist. Rev. 219. 
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1963) at 1. 
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Realism sees law not as an object, but as part of a larger system which is always in 
flux. Consequently, Realism tends to see law as a means to achieve some social end. 
Therefore, it adopts a functionalist approach which inquires into both the purpose and 
effects of law. Realism, more so than Positivism, sees any analytical separation of "is" and 
"ought" as purely heuristic and admits that values have an unavoidable impact upon legal 
rules. As against Positivism, Realism is sceptical as to the centrality of rules within the 
legal system. It argues that rules are both much less determinative than Positivists assume 
and frequently irrelevant to an explanation of what actually happens when legal decisions 
are made. Realism also casts doubt on the judicial rhetoric which claims that judging is 
politically neutral because judges are simply following the rules. As a result, Realism 
encourages us to look behind the rules to see what the judges are actually doing as 
opposed to what they say they are doing. Specifically, Realists encourage us to inquire 
into the personalities, prejudices, political sympathies, economic preferences, 
idiosyncrasies and other "non-rational" factors that affect actors within the legal system. 
Furthermore, if this inquiry into what is actually happening in the legal system is to be 
seriously pursued, then Realism demands that we draw upon disciplines outside of law to 
help us better understand law (sociology, economics, psychology, criminology, etc.). 
Finally, Realism suggests that there is a great deal more to law than simply looking at 
what the courts do. Law is part of a broader social system and has many dimensions 
beyond the judicial decisions. 
The impact of Realism in the United States, but not so much in Canada, has been quite 
pervasive, so that many lawyers claim "we are all Realists now." First, Realism has 
inspired important research in the non-rule governed aspects of our legal system such as 
the personal background of judges, the actual working of the jury system, the practical 
importance of the availability of legal r�presentation, etc. Second, as against the 
Positivists, Realists have highlighted the indeterminacy of rules and their diminishing 
centrality within the legal system. Third, the interdisciplinary impulse generated by 
Realism demonstrates the necessarily contextual and local nature of law-making, thereby 
stressing the importance of the actual individuals involved and their social complexity. 
Realism, not surprisingly, has its detractors. Positivists claim that Realists underplay 
the importance of rules and Natural Lawyers accuse them of instrumentalist social 
engineering, devoid of any conception of "the good". Artifactualism extends the critique, 
as will become obvious in the next section. 
D. ARTIFACTUALISM 
As a theory of law, Artifactualism builds upon the insights of Natural Law, Legal 
Positivism and Realism; at the same time, it criticizes these other theories. In common 
with Natural Law, Artifactualism recognizes that it is impossible to conceive of law 
without reference to the social values reflected in, and enforced by, law. However, 
according to Artifactualism, there is nothing separate or "out there" about law. What is 
universal, a priori, determinative and transhistorical to the Natural Lawyer, is contingent, 
historical, specific and local to the Artifactualist. So Artifactualists join with Legal 
Positivists in emphasizing that law is a human construct and that the focus should be on 
the more tangible dimensions of law. However, Artifactualists critique Legal Positivists 
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for focusing their quest on the essence of law, and for not pushing the agency analysis 
to its obvious conclusion: contextual analyses of what people actually do through law. It 
is argued that Positivists factor out just those aspects of human agency Artifactualists find 
to be of crucial significance, issues such as race, class and gender, for example. 
Moreover, the Positivistic quest for the essence of law in one sense echoes the 
assumption of the Natural Lawyers that there is something called Law, with a capital "L". 
Artifactualists reject this assumption. Rather, they argue that all we have is a system of 
socially constructed and coercively enforced norms - laws, in the plural and with a small 
"l" - and these laws are in many ways ad hoc and contingent. In other words, law, if the 
term is used at all, is only a short hand way of describing an extremely complex matrix 
of social forces. 
Through these claims, Artifactualism builds upon the insights of Realism. However, 
Artifactualists criticize Realism as being too individualistic in its analyses and 
insufficiently sensitive to the constitutive dimension of law. To elaborate: Artifactualists 
agree with the Realists that we must focus not on what judges say they do, but upon what 
they actually do. But Artifactualists claim that Realists exclude certain structural 
commonalities of the judiciary as, for example, their homogeneity in terms of class, race 
and gender. Moreover, Artifactualism posits that law is best understood as the complex 
product of a host of interacting social forces. Our legal system reflects and condenses 
these politically significant forces in juridically specific ways, while at the same time, 
helping to entrench and enforce them as societal norms. Artifactualists understand laws 
to be socially situated; laws are both reactive to and constitutive of the broader society 
in which they operate. More specifically, Artifactualists emphasize that law is about 
power; that it is not only a reflection of the power relations in our society, but that it 
simultaneously constitutes and legitimizes those power relations. Power is seen as 
relational because it is negotiated (although unequally) between the different communities 
in a society. For the Artifactualist, law is not simply perceived as an instrument of the 
power elites of modern society - although it reflects and supports their interests to a 
significant degree - but rather, it is conceptualized as a terrain of struggle over the 
meaning and quality of societal existence. 
Despite these profoundly diverse jurisprudential perspectives, one can map out a trail, 
overgrown and twisted much of the time, that suggests that the route has been one of what 
might be called "denaturalization", that we have been gradually coming to realize that law 
has no transhistorical, a priori or universal qualities. Law has no natural essence. It is 
merely a human construct. Even more importantly, Artifactualism signals a sort of 
jurisprudential gestalt. 10 Historically, the paradigm through which jurisprudential inquiry 
has been conceptualized is the law/morality framework. This approach, I would suggest, 
has now been decentred so that the currently predominant paradigm is that of law/politics. 
Artifactualism asks us to recognize that law is deeply embedded in, and constitutive of, 
10 By this expression I am drawing on the familiar psychological phenomenon of how the same thing 
can be perceived in two different and incommensurable ways. The classic examples are the sketch 
of the old woman/young woman and the vase/two faces. Once you see the second interpretation, you 
wonder how you ever missed it in the first place. 
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the larger power dynamics of contemporary society; that law is about particular choices 
made by particular people in specific contexts; and that law can be used either to reinforce 
disadvantage or to challenge it. Coming to terms with the denaturalization of law, I would 
argue, is not a slide into relativism or nihilism, because its focus on the pasted-together 
nature of law, while sensitive to structural forces and constraints, it valorizes human 
agency. It also makes us responsible for our legal system, and in particular, its warts. 
In the next section, building on the rethinking engendered by the theory of 
Artifactualism, I will provide the contours for a variety of jurisprudential perspectives that 
are premised upon this theory, perspectives that - with the exception of Liberalism -
highlight the problematic nature of contemporary Canadian law. These perspectives are: 
Liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, First Nations and Critical Legal Studies. 
III. ARTIFACTUALISM AND THE PERSPECTIVES 
Having identified the jurisprudential gestalt from debates that focused on the interaction 
between law and morality to those that focus on the nexus between law and power, we 
are now in a position to review some of the currently emerging perspectives and analyze 
the extent to which each fits with the concept of Artifactualism. 
A. LIBERALISM 
Liberal jurisprudence is the dominant mindframe of most legal thinkers - and 
practitioners - in Canada. In common with most jurisprudential perspectives, Liberal 
legal theory is premised upon a series of background assumptions, a broader political 
philosophy. As a result, it is necessary to indicate this background theory as it underpins 
so much of what is sometimes called "Liberal Legalism".11 In recent years, some Liberal 
thinkers have made much of the claim that Liberalism has no core determinative ideas, 
that as a political philosophy it is a pluralistic tradition.12 However, it seems to me, that 
11 
12 
Karl Klare defines "Liberal Legalism" thus: 
Liberal legalism is a particular historical incarnation of the Iegalist outlook, which 
characteristically serves as the philosophical foundation of .the legitimacy of the legal order 
in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to general, democratically 
promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and the radical separation 
of morals, politics, and personality from judicial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a 
complex of social practices and institutions that complement and elaborate upon its underlying 
political philosophy and jurisprudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form, 
these include adherence to precedent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and the 
judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligations to formulate legal rules on a general basis 
(the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to complex procedural formalities, and the search 
for specialized methods of analysis ("legal reasoning"). All of these institutions are designed 
to serve the fundamental desideratum of separating morals, politics, and personal bias from 
adjudication. 
"Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-
1941" (1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 at 276 (footnotes omitted). 
See, for example, D. Galloway, "Critical Mistakes" in R.F. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on 
Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Pub., 1990) 255 [hereinafter Perspectives]. Ted DeCoste 
has nicely described this as the "hide and seek" version of liberal analysis: F. DeCoste, "Taking A 
Stand: Theory in the Canadian Legal Academy" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 941 at 957. 
r 
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while there are dangers in unidimensionalizing what is clearly a very diverse political 
philosophy, there are still certain key aspects that are characteristic of Liberalism. 
Liberal political theory has as its starting point an ontology - a theory of being or 
personhood - that assumes a rational, free-choosing, autonomous self that is prior to, and 
independent of, both the community and other selves. That is to say, Liberalism takes as 
its premise an individualized self and upon this foundation constructs a political 
philosophy and legal theory that is designed to maximize the realm of action that is 
available to such a self. As a result, Liberal political philosophy argues that society should 
be governed by the principles of liberty, equality and neutrality. To be more specific, 
Liberalism advocates that the state and law should strive to provide the citizen with as 
much space as possible to pursue her own self interests (liberty); that each person should 
have the equal right to pursue such interests without formal restraints because of their 
identity, be it on the basis of their race, gender, class or ability (equality); and, that the 
state should remain agnostic as to the nature of a good life, thereby allowing each 
individual to determine their own conception of the good as they might choose it in the 
marketplace of ideas (neutrality). 
However, although Liberals consider the self to be ontologically prior to the 
community, they also recognize that we are social beings and that we live in conditions 
of interdependence. As a result, they argue that one of the key functions of law is to play 
a facilitative role, that is, to provide mechanisms for social interaction. For example, 
contract law has as its primary purpose the aspiration to facilitate the free flow of trade, 
as that will enable individuals to maximize their wealth and therefore pursue their own 
conception of the good. But Liberalism also recognizes that each individualized self, in 
her pursuit of her own privatized conception of the good, may bump into other selves, 
thereby potentially depriving other selves of the virtues of liberty and equality. Liberalism 
sees a further purpose of law, as the public manifestation of the communal will, to be the 
mediation/regulation of these interactions. A second (regulative) function of law then is 
to determine when one person's actions have a negative impact upon another, and to 
prohibit such infractions. This is usually called "the harm principle": one cannot use one's 
own liberty to infringe that of another. In sum, then, as Jamie Cassels points out: 
At its best, the function of law is to maximize the autonomy of rational agents in a way that is compatible 
with the similar autonomy of others and that does not illegitimately prefer any one agent's conception 
of the good over that of another. 
Law is said to be legitimate because it is founded on the consent of the governed, is enacted according 
to fair rules of participation and procedure, serves to expand autonomy by setting the ground rules for 
individual and co-operative activity, and is applied by courts acting as neutral arbiters in an impartial and 
rational fashion.13 
There are, of course, many variations on this story. For example, a significant debate 
rages between utilitarian and rights-based ( deontological) Liberals. This controversy 
13 J. Cassels, "Liberal Presuppositions" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 378 at 380 (footnotes omitted). 
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revolves around the question of where to  draw the bright line between the individual and 
the community. Utilitarians tend to give greater weight to the community than to the 
individual. The classic example is the situation where utilitarians suggest that it may be 
appropriate to kill one person to save the lives of ten. Deontological Liberals, to the 
contrary, argue that there are certain basic rights that are so inviolable that they can never 
be overridden by any collective good. Rights trump.14 This tension is embedded in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which, on the one hand, espouses a series of 
seemingly entrenched ( deontological) rights, but allows these to be curtailed if to do so 
would (in a utilitarian sense) be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 
Another important debate centres upon the meaning of equality. Classical Liberals, in 
support of the principle of state neutrality, tend to espouse a rather formalistic conception 
of equality: that the state cannot discriminate against anyone on the basis of their identity. 
More progressive Liberals argue that this is too anaemic a conception of equality and that 
to counteract past inequalities it may be necessary for the state to take proactive steps to 
help certain disadvantaged individuals to be able to truly compete. It is these two 
competing conceptions of equality that underlie debates around issues such as employment 
equity15 and the regulation of pornography. The more substantive approach seems to 
have gained legitimacy through s. 15(2) of the Charter and, for example, the decision of 
the Supreme Court in R. v. Butler.16 
To a significant degree, Liberal Legalism accepts some of the key arguments of 
Artifactualism. It recognizes that law is, at bottom, a human construct and it attempts to 
develop rules and principles that will give effect to its preferred principles of individual 
liberty, freedom, equality and neutrality. However, within this tradition there is a tendency 
to shy away from a full embracement of Artifactualism in that many Liberals claim that 
these principles have transcendent or universal qualities that are noncontingent and non­
negotiable. Usually, such claims are based upon some idea of communally agreed upon 
norms thereby assuming a consensual theory of society. Such consensualism, as will 
become obvious when we look at other perspectives, is rejected by most Artifactualists. 
B. MARXISM 
Marxism is a star example of a jurisprudential perspective that would reject the 
consensualist assumptions of Liberalism. It points to the pervasiveness of class divisions 
in Canadian society to argue that our legal norms and system are deeply complicitous in 
the perpetuation of unequal relations of power. One thing that distinguishes the Canadian 
legal academy, at least from its American counterparts, is the existence of relatively strong 
leftist analyses of law. Although the United States, as we shall see, provided the cradle 
· for Critical Legal Studies, that was very much a late 1970s phenomenon, whereas leftism 
in Canada has had a much more venerable history. In part, this may be due to the political 
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be related to the English connection and the class consciousness of elements of that 
tradition. Whatever the reason, there exists within Canada a prolific and relatively large 
collection of jurisprudents who conceive of themselves as left of centre. 
Although not all jurisprudents with a left attachment would go as far as describing 
themselves as Marxists, Marxist legal theory is alive and well and continues to produce 
critiques of mainstream legal philosophy. Although Marx had some legal education, he 
never produced a fully developed theory of law. Rather, scholars have extrapolated from 
his and Engels ' many volumes of writings an approximation of what might have been said 
had he addressed himself to the topic in any systematic way. However, there are a 
plurality of interpretations of Marx and his tentative reflections on law. Consequently, 
there is, in fact, no orthodox Marxist theory of law. Having said this, it is suggested that, 
in spite of the important differences among Marxists, there is consensus that two 
necessary, though not sufficient, elements must underlie any philosophy of law that 
considers itself Marxist: a consideration of the relationship between the economy and law, 
and correlatively, an analysis of the relationship between class and law. Together, these 
inquiries tend to generate a critique of law from without, to emphasize the connection 
between law and the power centres of society, and to suggest that law may be more 
closely related to domination than equality. 
As these comments indicate, a Marxist theory of law operates on a very different set 
of philosophical and ontological assumptions from Liberalism. Rather than taking as its 
starting point a universalist conception of the individuated and autonomous self, Marxism 
begins with a theory of history - historical materialism - and then locates its theory of 
the person, as well as its political and legal theory, within that historical account. History 
and social circumstances precede and predetermine the self, society, politics and law. Judy 
Fudge explains historical materialism as follows: 
The source of historical change for Marx is the conflict between direct producers (slaves, serfs, or 
workers) and those who reap the benefit of that production (owners, masters, or employers). This conflict 
is known as class struggle. Marx 's understanding of history is in direct contrast to the Whiggish (liberal) 
view that dynamic morality and affectivity propel the transformations of history. Central to historical 
materialism is the concept of mode of production (the organization of productive forces, labour, the 
instruments and materials of production), which confers a fundamental social unity on a social formation, 
allocating their objective positions to the classes within it, and distributing agents within it. The mode 
of production "constitutes the structure which determines what form the growth of the productive forces, 
and the distribution of the surplus will take, how society can or cannot change its structures, and how at 
suitable moments, the transition to another mode of production can or will take place." Relations of 
production are relations of economic power, of the economic power people enjoy or lack over labour 
power and the means of production. Capitalist productive relations are defined by the separation of the 
direct producers from the means of production. In order to subsist, workers must sell their services to the 
owners of property. The owners thus have a monopoly on domination and control over the economic 
I 
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surplus. Moreover, they have control over the production process itself, enabling them to organize the 
labour process in order to extract the maximum amount of effort from their employees.17 
Law, in this perspective, is a second order social phenomenon, a byproduct of class 
conflict. For example, Marxists point to the way in which economic relations set the 
parameters for the operation of legal principles, concepts and rules, claiming that the law 
tends to facilitate and reinforce relations of class exploitation. In particular, Marxists draw 
our attention to what they sometimes call the "essential legal relations": property and 
contract law . Property law is crucial to the establishment and perpetuation of capitalist 
social relations because the proprietary right constitutes a "private" realm of control, 
autonomy and exploitation. Contract law is the mechanism by which property is 
exchanged, that is, where the capacity for exploitation is circulated so that wealth is 
maximized. These types of law would not necessarily be problematic if we lived in a 
substantially equal society. But a capitalist society is a structurally unequal society and 
so property and contract law consolidate and reinforce such inequality by conferring legal 
right on economic power. 
One of the most nefarious examples of this merger of legal right with concepts of 
property and contract is the employment contract. In this situation, there is an appearance 
that the employer and the employee are free and equal to enter into a contract where the 
employer exchanges his property (wages) with the employee's property (labour power). 
The problem is that this happy picture fails to correlate with reality.  First, the employer 
does not tend to pay the employee for the full value of her labour, that is, employers 
exploit "surplus labour value" of employees. Second, whereas the employer usually has 
options as to where and how to invest his money, the employee only has her labour power 
to sell and usually has extremely limited mobility or job opportunities. Law, therefore, 
through the employment contract, obfuscates reality and legitimizes exploitation. 
Moreover, it plays an even more direct role in that it regulates employment relations more 
generally by, for example, coercing employees when they resist exploitation and through 
the deradicalization of trade unions by intensive regulation.18 
Marxists frequently generalize their concerns about property and contract rights to a 
broader scepticism about rights discourse itself. So, for example, they ask about the 
"rights" of those who, because of their class position, are the object of state violence 
through criminalization and incarceration .19 Furthermore, they are extremely concerned 
about the entrenchment of the Charter in that it inculcates and disseminates a societal 
"rights consciousness" that relocates social activism from the democratic realm to the 
judicial realm. For example, by highlighting a series of Supreme Court decisions, Marxists 
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the Trade Union movement, which has been very unsuccessful in its appearances in the 
courts.21 For Marxists, law is an unlikely terrain for progressive social transformation. 
C. FEMINISM 
There is something curious about the history of mainstream jurisprudence. In the main, 
its producers, be they Natural Lawyers, Legal Positivists, Liberals or radicals, have been 
male; the voices of women have been excluded. On reflection, the absence of women 
should come as no surprise because legal practice, legal education, the legislatures and the 
judiciary have all been male dominated. Consequently, the more classical reflections on 
the meaning, purpose, nature and concept of law have reflected male perceptions and 
interpretations. 
Despite the differences between, for example, Natural Law, Legal Positivism and 
Liberalism, they all share the assumption that aJl human beings are at bottom the same, 
and that sameness of treatment should be the benchmark of legality. Marxism, with its 
emphasis on the differential impact that law has on class relations, calls into question the 
idea of the jurisprudence of sameness, and raises the possibility of a jurisprudence of 
difference. Feminism has taken this viewpoint one step further. 
Like many of the other perspectives on contemporary legal theory, there are a diversity 
of Feminist approaches to jurisprudence; there is no official Feminist line. However, it 
seems to me that philosophy professor Susan Sherwin has captured the aspiration of 
Feminism when she argues: 
Feminism is an awareness of the political and social implications of sex and discrimination within society. 
It is an awareness that the discrimination facing women is not just a concern about equality among 
individuals, but is systematic. Feminism is a political commitment to changing the systematic force and 
values inherent in patriarchy.22 
The first rumblings of Feminist jurisprudence in Canada occurred during the 1970s with 
the publication of Lorenne Clark's and Debra Lewis' Rape: The Price of Coercive 
Sexuality. 23 The basic thesis of this book was that the law of rape was not conceptualized 
as a violation of women, indeed even as a form of gender specific violence, but rather as 
a property crime against the capitalistic ownership rights of men. Since then, there has 
been a proliferation of Feminist analyses of law which, for heuristic purposes, we might 
break down into the subcategories of liberal, integrative, radical, socialist and race­
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Liberal Feminism was the first major wave of Feminist legal theory, protesting against 
women's exclusion from the practice and paradigms of the legal system. The analysis . 
primarily focused on the harm to women as individuals of a discriminatory legal system 
and sought remedies through the assertion of individual rights. This led to calls for the 
creation of gender neutral rules, equal opportunity to participate in the legal system, and 
equal benefit of the law. The assumption underlying liberal Feminism was that the basic 
structure of Canadian society was essentially fair and all that was needed were some 
modifications so that women could be treated the same as men. This is sometimes 
described as an "add women and stir feminism." 
A recognition of the limitations of this perspective led to the emergence of what has 
become known as integrative Feminism. Those who support this perspective argue that 
the assumption of sameness that underlies liberal Feminism sells Feminist analysis, and 
therefore women as a class, short. Integrative Feminists argue that a sameness approach 
is flawed in that it retains men as the benchmark of value and fails to recognize the 
specificity and differences of women's lives. Integrative Feminism therefore rejects the 
assumption that the basic structure of Canadian society is essentially fair, and argues for 
significant social restructuring. 
More specifically, integrative Feminists argue that formal equality, gender neutrality 
and equal opportunity projects (though an improvement) do not go far enough. They 
advocate what they call "substantive equality" or "equality of results", because, if 
achieved, this would mean that women could be in a position of existential equality so as 
to pursue their own goals. Pushing this analysis to its contextual conclusion, integrative 
Feminists posit that, given women's unequal social status, it will be necessary to treat 
women differently in order to achieve equality. Hence they advocate for employment 
equity and gender specific legal norms such as the defence of the "battered woman 
syndrome" as adopted in R. v. Lavallee.25 Moreover, integrative Feminists analyze the 
values that underlie many of our social structures and legal practices and argue that such 
values are masculine and propose that we need to imbue the system with more 
"gynocentric" values.26 
This critique of "malestream" perspectives and the move to a focus on women's 
perspective as a class is adopted and developed by radical Feminists. Radical Feminists 
argue that our legal structure is grounded in maleness, not only in form but also in 
substance. In particular, they argue that the relationship between men and women in 
contemporary "patriarchal" society more closely approximates domination than equality. 
Patriarchy is identified as a systematic social practice that determines our public and 
private lives, the economy, our social interactions, modern culture, state policies and the 
legal system. Specifically, radical Feminist jurisprudents tend to focus their attention on 
violence against women and argue that violence is the logical extension of a male 
supremacism that also manifests itself in our laws relating to, inter alia, employment, 
reproduction, sexual harassment and pornography. 
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Socialist Feminists agree with radical Feminists that sexuality is a major source of 
women's oppression and that our legal system assists in reinforcing and perpetuating 
women's subordination. However, they also argue that there is another factor that 
complicates the analysis of women's subordination: class. While women on one level 
share the commonality of gender, they are differently affected by their class position. Jn. 
this approach, gender and class are seen to be equally crucial in understanding women's 
oppression because depending upon different stages of a capitalist society there may be 
different forms of patriarchal oppression. Hence, abortion law is often a focus of socialist 
Feminist analysis.27 Additionally, argue socialist Feminists, this awareness of class 
situatedness and historical contingency is crucial in determining what sort of strategies 
women might pursue in their resistances to male domination. 
Finally, race conscious Feminists claim that the picture of women's subordination is 
even more complex than even radical or Socialist Feminists suggest. Interlocking with the 
analytic variables of gender and class is the dynamic of racism.28 As women of colour 
and First Nations women have argued, women's identities cannot be understood as 
unidimensional. Rather, there are a multitude of social forces structuring women's 
experiences and that multiple (and even multidimensional) strategies need to be developed 
in order to deal with these differentiated aspects of their reality. Family law issues are 
particularly identified as a problematic area where these complexities manifest 
themselves.29 
In sum, Feminist analyses of contemporary society and modern law reject completely 
the suggestion that there is anything consensual, neutral, objective or supra-political about 
law. For them, it is clear that law is but a holograph of the patriarchal imagination and 
that that imagination has constructed a reality that is deeply antithetical to women's 
equality. Reconstructive programs will require both the vision and will power to recognize 
the depth of the oppression, and to take remedial steps that will factor in the diversity of 
women's experiences. 
D. FIRST NATIONS 
A central aspect of Artifactualistic analyses is to interrogate and render contingent those 
perspectives that are so entrenched that they are automatically taken to be incontrovertible. 
The ambition is not so much to prove that those perspectives are wrong - although that 
is frequently a byproduct of these critical processes - but to demonstrate that they are 
partial in their accounts. And "partial" is utilized in both senses, as meaning both 
incomplete and partisan. The aspiration is that by decentering and denaturalizing the 
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Marxism and Feminism, as we have seen, dovetail quite nicely with this Artifactualist 
paradigm. So, too, does First Nations' jurisprudence. Traditionally in Canada, the 
dominant jurisprudential assumption has been that the white legal structures - be they 
common law or civil law - should be determinative of our legal system. It has been 
presumed that the juridical structures and norms of both of these traditions, premised as 
they are on the "advanced" legal traditions of Britain and France (Britain with the Rule 
of Law, and France with its Rights of Man (sic)) are necessarily superior to the 
indigenous legal norms - if any - of the "primitive" native culture. White law, like 
white . religion, had a salvationist agenda. Moreover, these imperialist assumptions 
corresponded with the conception that law is the embodiment of universalist principles 
which, by definition, had to be necessarily common across Canada.30 
So powerful has this juridical hegemony been that it is only very recently that First 
Nations jurisprudence even surfaced as a voice in the jurisprudential conversation. While 
Aboriginal peoples have always had a sense of their own legal norms and structures, in 
spite of legal colonialism, it is only recently that they have managed to intervene 
effectively in Canadian jurisprudential debates. But their intervention demonstrates, in a 
profoundly dramatic way, the political dimensions of law and, more particularly, the harm 
of law.31 
The first stage of First Nations' jurisprudence was reactive and focused on the coercive 
dimensions of law. More specifically, it was argued that law had been used to dispossess 
Aboriginal peoples of their lands through the conceptualization of treaties as enforceable 
contracts with sufficient consideration, or that the Indian Act32 and the reserve system 
disenfranchised and marginalized First Nations peoples, making them dependent wards of 
the state. Hence the embarrassing, or perhaps more accurately shameful, suggestion that 
when South Africa was establishing its structure of apartheid, it was inspired in part by 
Canada's system of reserves. More recently, a great deal of attention has focused on the 
way in which the criminal justice system of Canada has been not merely discriminatory 
in its treatment of First Nations people, but actively racist. It is in this light that we can 
understand not just the high profile inquiries, such as the Marshall Inquiry,33 but the 
everyday normalized racism of police, judicial and prison practices that operate as a 
conveyor belt to incarcerate huge proportions of the First Nations' communities.34 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that it is not just the criminal process that is 
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Indeed, First Nations jurists have pushed their critiques so far that they have begun to 
articulate the contours of a reconstructive program. While Marxists and Feminists have 
been extremely critical of law and have called for significant transformations of our legal 
system so as to be less oppressive and more inclusive of those who have been 
subordinated, their assumption is still essentially integrationist :  they seek to have their 
perspectives incorporated within a (dramatically) reconstructed version of the prevailing 
legal system. There is some sense of continuity. This is not true of First Nations' claims. 
Espousing what might be called a radical jurisprudence of difference, they argue that the 
current Canadian legal order is so profoundly incompatible with First Nations' cultures 
that separation is required. So, for example, they argue that the assumptions of the 
Charter - the supremacy of God and the rule of law - as well as the hegemonic 
discourse of legal rights, are culturally specific (i.e. Eurocentric) and therefore, alien to 
Aboriginal forms of social interaction, 37 which place greater emphasis on duty, respect 
and responsibility. 38 
Consequently, the emergence of a First Nations' jurisprudence heralds an Artifactualist 
crisis for mainstream Canadian legal thought. All along it has been assumed that with 
suitable reupholstering, the legal system could incorporate and therefore deradicalize the 
perspectives of those who have been excluded. To some extent, that has been achieved 
with the working classes through collective bargaining, and with women through the 
constitutionalization of equality provisions. Aboriginal jurists, angered by the way in 
.which the legal system played a crucial and active role in their subordination and 
marginalization, consider the dominant legal culture to be irretrievably antithetical to their 
interests and therefore unsalvageable. Thus, their calls for self determination and separate 
criminal justice systems indicate a profound shift from a legal philosophy that was 
premised upon an assumption of unity and sameness, to a legal philosophy that asserts the 
necessity for the acknowledgement of difference and the embracing of radical heterodoxy. 
E. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
Critical Legal Studies takes the idea of Artifactualism to its fullest extent, though it 
tends to be somewhat less existentially grounded than some of the more politically 
specific jurisprudential perspectives, such as Feminism or First Nations' jurisprudence. 
Critical Legal Studies is more of an American phenomenon than it is Canadian. As I 
suggested earlier, Critical Legal Studies emerged in the United States because of the 
historical absence of a left legal academy, whereas in Canada there has been a stronger 
leftist (Marxist/socialist) tradition. But there are a group of scholars who work in Canada 
and who see themselves as critical legal theorists. The distinctive characteristic of such 
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believe that insights from other disciplines can help us to better understand law; (b) that 
they draw particularly heavily on leftist European theory, particularly in its German and 
French forms; and ( c) that they attempt to be integrative in their critical analyses of law, 
in that they seek to demonstrate how the dominating impulses of law are pervasive and 
systemic and therefore manifest in terms of gender, race and class oppression.39 
Critical Legal Studies makes a conscious effort to deny as many of the arguments, 
techniques and presuppositions of traditional legal theory as it possibly can. In particular, 
it argues that an understanding of law cannot be divorced from an understanding of the 
social context of law, and therefore posits that a jurisprudence must be close! y tied to 
some larger social theory. This leads most critical theorists to argue that law is merely a 
form of politics and thus drives them to inquire not only as to the ways in which law both 
expresses and encodes its politics, but also to the way in which law constructs the broader 
politics of Canada. So, for example, a key argument of critical legal scholars is that law 
is not just a "reflection" of larger social forces, but is actually constitutive of our social 
and political relations. This thesis as to the formative role of law is manifested, for 
example, in critical concerns about the way in which the espousal of Charter claims 
confers greater authority to an unelected judiciary, and thereby undercuts not merely 
democratic institutions such as Parliament, but also induces a discourse of rights that may 
be excessively individualistic.40 
The aspiration of Critical Legal Studies is both to annunciate and denunciate, and its 
emphasis has been on the latter. In particular, Critical Legal Studies focus on what it calls 
"Liberalism", but it is a broad conception of Liberalism that goes beyond that of the 
differing political parties, to a conception of Liberalism as a politico-philosophical 
worldview that has dominated our consciousnes� since the Enlightenment. Drawing on the 
insights of a variety of perspectives including neo-marxism, structuralism, phenomenology, 
poststructuralism, deconstructive literary criticism, and critical theory, "Crits" posit that 
Liberalism is an ideological mindframe that is premised upon the excessive priorization 
of the individualized conception of the person. The concern is that this ontological 
fetishization of the individual (to coin a phrase) fails to appreciate fully the ways in which 
the individual is the product of the social forces that inscribe her personality. Worse still, 
the priorization of the individual is entrenched by the tendency of law to constitute and 
enforce legal rights. The effect of this is twofold: first, it tends to insulate those who have 
power from challenges by those who are dispossessed; second, it reinforces the ideology 
of individualism and thereby undercuts our communal aspirations. In short, Crits argue 
that Liberalism, despite its best intentions, is an apology for, and legitimization of, the 
continued inequality and subordination that is a pervasive aspect of North Atlantic 
societies, be it on the basis of gender, class or race. 
Critical Legal Studies focuses particular attention on the role of the judiciary and even 
more specifically on the politics of judicial method. Not only does it concur with 
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Marxists, Feminists and race-conscious scholars that judges as a group are an 
unrepresentative and unsympathetic elite, but it also argues that legal method itself is a 
profound part of the problem. To elaborate, Crits argue that judges recognize that their 
role is necessarily political and that this causes a legitimation crisis because they are 
unelected. The judicial responses, not necessarily conscious or conspiratorial, are twofold. 
The first is to reify the judicial process, for example, by talking about "The Court", as 
opposed to particular judges, and by the introduction of a whole series of hierarchical 
rituals that attempt to put the judge beyond reproach.41 The second strategy of denial and 
legitimation is the judicial tendency to invoke legal precedent and rules to claim that they 
have little or no choice, by protesting that their hands are tied, and that they are simply 
applying the law. Drawing on the techniques of deconstructive literary criticism, Crits 
argue that there is no such thing as determinative rules in a strong sense. This is 
sometimes called "the indeterminacy thesis" and it posits that for every rule there is a 
counter rule or an exception, that for every principle there is a counter principle, and that 
for every policy there is a countervailing policy. In short, the critical proposition is that 
the judiciary have a great deal more scope for choice than they are willing to admit, and 
so they are forced into accept.ing personal responsibility for the political significance of 
the decisions they make. Objectivity and impartiality - those pseudo-legitimizing criteria 
for judicial office - are unattainable. All judicial decision-making is political decision­
making. 
The positive dimension of the critical agenda is that, in having demystified both the 
legal system and legal method, we can then candidly recognize that law is about power 
and thereby hold these powerbrokers accountable for their practices. Second, Crits call 
into question the very identity of those who make the law and ask by what authority, or 
perhaps more accurately by what authoritarianism, do they presume to enforce their 
worldview on others? Third, Critical Legal Studies demands a greater articulation and 
justification of reasons for decisions beyond the superficial references to precedent. 
Specifically Crits call for an open acknowledgement of the political presuppositions upon 
which the judgments are founded. Fourth, they call for greater representation of those who 
have been oppressed by and marginalized in the decision-making processes, be they 
judicial or democratic. And finally, Critical Legal Studies does not back away from the 
proposition that law is politics because it does not believe that it is possible to avoid 
power relations. Law is power and power is real, and so, the Crits say, let us admit that 
and proceed to minimize the power differentials that are so pervasive in Canadian society. 
Crits, like every other perspective, are subject to criticism. First, they are accused of 
"theoreticism", that is, using lots of fancy European theory, but incapable of suggesting 
practical solutions. Second, they are accused of being too cynical about law and rights, 
and that if they would only get out of their ivory tow·er, they would see that if you are at 
the bottom of the social hierarchy, law is more ambiguous. While law and rights are not 
everything, they are not nothing either. Third, Crits are pilloried as nihilists, as advocates 
of the absence of regulative social standards by which to evaluate social conduct, and 
therefore dangerous. Each of these criticisms has been the subject of extensive and 
41 W. Conklin, "A Contract" in Perspectives, supra note 12 at 207. 
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ongoing debate among Crits themselves, and while significant differences remain, the 
common sentiment seems to be that an awareness of such dangers is preferable to an 
uncritical blind faith in a legal system that is complicitous in the perpetuation of 
domination and subordination. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Over the years, much has been made of the proposition that Canadians have had an 
impoverished jurisprudence.42 In this short essay, I have attempted to suggest that this 
is no longer the case. By briefly drawing on the metaphor of a topography, I have posited 
that the switch from the cartography of law and morality to the cartography of law and 
politics provides us a map that is more vivid, more detailed and more interesting. Indeed, 
I would conjecture further that, within the Canadian legal academy, there is a rapid 
increase in the number of people whose primary interest is in legal theory43 and that this 
interest is engendered in large part by a recognition that both our legal system and the 
very idea of law itself are in serious trouble. This is a phenomenon that is not unique to 
the Canadian legal academy, or even law. There is an increasing sense within many 
disciplines that important technological, political, social, economic and intellectual 
transitions are underway and that these will destabilize and reconfigure our daily practices. 
Law, I would suggest, is not immune from these transitions and legal theory is beginning 
to articulate the significance of these dynamics. It is a hope of this essay that those in 
legal practice will take heed of these transitions - and respond in a reflective, inclusive 
and imaginative manner. 
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See, for example, M. Cohen, "The Condition of Legal Education in Canada" (1950) 28 Can. Bar Rev. 
267; F.R. Scott, "Report of Committee on Legal Research" (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 999; 
M. MacGuigan, Jurisprudence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966) 652; Report to the 
S.S.H.R.C. from the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning 
(Ottawa: S.S.H.R.C., 1983). 
Some evidence of this is supported by the emergence of several new jurisprudential journals over the 
last decade including, for example, the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law and the Journal of Human Justice. 
